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Ethics Committees and Consultants at Work
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Commentary: The Questions We
Shouldn’t Ask
Lance Wahlert and Autumn Fiester
Clinical ethics consults take as a given
that the moral standing of the consult
itself—the act of calling for and conducting an ethics consult—is beyond
reproach. Our working assumption is
that bioethicists are always justified in
asking about the moral permissibility
of fulfilling patients’ requests or meeting their demands. In this consult, then,
the pressing ethical issue seems to be
whether we ought to provide IVF services to this HIV-discordant trans couple. But ‘‘ought we to assist?’’ is not only
the wrong question; it is a question that
wrongs the subjects of the consult.
Although an ethics consult was called
in this case, what is striking here is the
complete ordinariness of the patients’ request: because HIV has become a chronic,
clinically manageable illness and IVF has
become the standard protocol to address
fertility-related concerns of discordant
couples,1 it is clinically and ethically commonplace to use ART to avoid putting
the seronegative partner (and the fetus)
at risk for HIV transmission. This bestpractice standard is both highly effective
and clinically uncontroversial.2 We have
to ask what aspect of this case deems
it ethically problematic, warranting an
ethics consult in the first place. Using the
helpful term coined by Tod Chambers in
his work on the genre of clinical ethics
cases, we need to ask what is the source
of the case’s ‘‘reportability’’3—the break
in the clinical routine that merits our
moral attention.
Parsing this case for its reportability,
there are only two features to explore:
(1) what is being requested and (2) who
is making the request. The former has
already been shown to be an ethical nonstarter, because the request fits squarely
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within the standard of care for this
patient population. That only leaves the
latter: this case must hinge on the who-isasking component, and that conclusion
will lay bare the real ethical controversy
of this case. If a heterosexual, gendernormative, HIV-discordant couple came
to a fertility clinic to request IVF, there
would be no hesitation and certainly no
ethical second-guessing of the patients’
request. In other words, there would be
no ethics consult.
An ethics consultant might justify
the extra attention paid here by the mere
fact that this is an unusual request; it
is not a routine occurrence that a MTF
transwoman wants to impregnate a
FTM transman who will be the couple’s
gestational carrier, so the out-of-theordinary configuration of the couple
itself justifies asking about the moral permissibility of assisting. And after all—
this argument and the colloquialism
goes—there’s no harm in asking. When
it comes to clinical ethics consultations,
the received view is that there isn’t
anything problematic in asking about
the moral permissibility of a clinical action. This stance would likely see ethical
reinforcement in the fact that these reflections couldn’t have burdened this couple,
because the consult took place without
their knowledge.
But all of this speaks to the core ethical problem in the case: clinical ethics
takes it as a given that there is a right—
even an obligation—to engage in a searching inquiry into the clinical choices of
some types of patients, even when what
those patients want is an ordinary request
in other patients’ hands. The troubling
moral problem here is not the patients’
IVF request but our insistence on a thorough, discriminating evaluation of that
request. It is simply not true that any and
all questioning of patients’ clinical choices
is fair game; if we subjected a heterosexual
couple to this kind of minute inquiry, they
would be highly offended—with cause.
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The moral charge that would be leveled
against us would be impertinence. They
would accuse us of prying, a presumptuous and intrusive overstepping of appropriate clinical boundaries. Inside the
standard of care for infertility treatment,
there is no legitimate space to inquire
about whom to treat, the quality of a
couple’s relationship, their parenting
skills, their emotional stability, or the
duration of the desire to parent.
In everyday parlance, the name for
this level of searing examination is
scrutiny, and it is not value neutral. In
fact, its pernicious character might best
be explained by examining the suspicious gaze that drives this scrutiny. We
coin the phrase ‘‘the suspicious gaze’’ to
describe the stance of skepticism and
mistrust that providers unwittingly take
toward particular categories of patients.
The suspicious gaze manifests itself as
a systematic type of apprehension and
doubt about what particular patients
say they want, the rationale they give
for wanting it, and their future satisfaction and contentment when they actually get it. The suspicious gaze impugns
the patient’s credibility, reliability, and
stability. As captured in the proverb
‘‘consider the source,’’ even the most ordinary of clinical requests seem to necessitate a closer look when these patients
make them; in others words, these requests demand scrutiny.
The demand for an ethics consult in
this clinically unremarkable case inadvertently betrays the existence of the
suspicious gaze toward trans patients.
In fact, we believe that whereas the
suspicious gaze is especially intense,
and the level of scrutiny particularly
high, in the arena of childbearing (with
its overlapping layers of gender identity, sexuality, procreation, parenting,
and coupledom), both the gaze and the
scrutiny are found in most areas of
trans healthcare. This is but just one
instance of the global stance providers

take toward transpersons—prior to,
during, and after transition.
Consider the very process required for
a transperson to transition, hormonally
or surgically, from one sex to another:
they are without exception subjected to
an invasive and prolonged level of scrutiny before clinical providers, assuming
their gate-keeping role, will approve and
then afford the means to transition.4
Trans individuals must secure clinical
approval to become the sex they maintain they always already were, and it is
clinicians who will or will not grant
passage from one gender or heteronormative category into another. The transperson is required to give personal and
intimate testimonial to secure permission from the provider, whose default
position is always one of skepticism. The
burden of overcoming clinical doubt is
always placed on the trans individual,
and so the trans clinical narrative of scrutiny, surveillance, suspicion, and (ultimately) permission or denial is built into
the very fabric of that patient-provider
relationship. This unique trans clinical
narrative appears in every arena of
trans clinical care, mirroring the original
request-scrutiny-approval pattern. The
underlying, and ethically problematic,
implication of this pattern is that there
is a legitimate, justifiable rationale to
question the clinical requests of transpersons; there is an inherent, unacknowledged assumption among providers that
transpersons are unreliable, unstable, and
maybe even self-deceived when making
clinical choices. The suspicious gaze
that is generated through the transition
process of transpersons permeates all
aspects of their future clinical care, and
it is merely amplified in the reproductive
realm, with all that is at stake there.
Returning now to the case, we have
more clarity about why the very question
‘‘ought we to assist?’’ wrongs the patients
involved. The question itself is a species
of clinical accusation or indictment in the
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absence of cause. The question reveals
an unjustified, demeaning assumption
about the couple before us, that merely
by virtue of being transgender, they may
be unfit for parenthood. This ethics consult is an implicit demand for these
individuals to prove themselves worthy
of the right to procreate that all others
have by default.
What assumptions about this couple’s ability to parent might the clinical
team be making here? If transpersons
have an unstable gender, will they be
unstable parents? Will they raise unstable children? More specifically to this
case, if a FTM transman wants to bear
a child, has he essentially backed out of
his previous, as we might phrase it,
‘‘clinical agreement’’ to be a full-fledged
man? Likewise, has an MTF transwoman broken the contract of her clinical agreement by curtailing estrogen
treatments such that he can impregnate
a partner? The dilemma of trans parentage, thus, is not really about who should
access IVF treatment; it is really a dilemma generated by the constellation of
the suspicious gaze coupled with the
overarching trans clinical narrative that
marks these patients as second class as
adult agents.
Whereas some might make the case
that transpersons can form committed
couples, make loving parents, and raise
happy and healthy children, these are
all irrelevant to the ethics of this scenario. Other persons seeking IVF treatment (such as married heterosexuals,
single women, and partnered straight
persons) are not scrutinized about
either the health of their relationships
or the potential quality of their future
children’s lives. Transpersons should be
held to the same standards, and therefore we should not even entertain asking such questions about trans partners.
Not only does this case reveal the bias of
heteronormativity; it also bears the
mark of transphobia.
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Notes
1. According to protocol at leading fertility
practices.
2. Based on clinical evidence.
3. Chambers, Fiction of Bioethics.
4. Based on a quick review of the process.
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Commentary: Crossing Cultural
Divides: Transgender People Who
Want to Have Children
Timothy F. Murphy
In this case, clinicians called for an
ethics consultation to discuss a request
they found unusual: two transgender
people in a relationship wanted help in
having a child.1 In the course of committee meetings like these, clinicians
and academics will typically discuss
the request with one another, and if
their expertise were to fall short, they
might seek counsel outside their ranks.2
Moreover, when requests to clinicians
involve clashes of culture, experts typically recommend broad deference to
views that differ from those of the clinicians. In a case recently discussed in
the pages of this journal, an ethics committee was advised to bend over backward to accommodate the religious
views of a son making decisions on
his mother’s behalf, never mind that
doing so left his mother worse off than
she might otherwise have been and never
mind that at least one religious scholar
offered the son a religious interpretation
that could have spared his mother considerable pain and discomfort.3
In the case at hand, the cultural divide in question is as deep as any to be
found between conflicting religious
interpretations; it involves two people
who have abdicated the sex assigned to
them at birth. This transgender man
and transgender woman are looking

